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Abstract
We propose a new model of ¯rm reputation that interprets reputation directly as the market
belief about product quality. Quality is persistent and is determined endogenously by the ¯rm's
past investments. We analyse how investment incentives depend on the ¯rm's reputation and
derive implications for reputational dynamics.
We consider three types of consumer learning. When consumers learn about quality through
good news, investment incentives are decreasing in reputation, leading to a unique work-shirk
equilibrium and convergent dynamics. When consumers learn through bad news, investment
incentives are increasing in reputation, leading to a continuum of shirk-work equilibria and
divergent dynamics. Finally, when consumers learn through Brownian news and the cost of
investment is low, incentives are hump-shaped but a work-shirk equilibrium exists and is es-
sentially unique.
1 Introduction
In most industries ¯rms can invest into the quality of their products through human capital
investment, research and development, and organisational change. While imperfect monitoring
by customers gives rise to a moral hazard problem, the ¯rm can share in the created value by
building a reputation for quality, justifying premium prices. This paper analyses the incentives for
investment in such a market, characterising how these incentives are determined by the current
reputation of the ¯rm and the market information structure.
Our key innovation is to model reputation directly as the market belief about the ¯rm's en-
dogenous product quality. As quality is determined by past investments, it is persistent and can
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have a state variable, and reputation models in which the state variable is exogenous. As a con-
sequence, reputational dynamics in our model are endogenously driven by reputational incentives,
rather than trailing exogenous shocks.
The model captures key features of many important industries. In labour markets such as
those for academics, artists and advertising executives, agents spend much of their time investing
in skills and perfecting their trade. Their reputation and future compensation, however, depends
heavily on their best paper, performance or campaign. In the computer industry, component man-
ufacturers invest heavily into research and development while customers are only able to observe
the performance of the entire computer. Customers therefore often learn about the quality of the
product through newsworthy incidences, such as Dell's 2006 recall of 4 million Sony lithium-ion
batteries.1 In the car industry, ¯rms devote considerable resources to improving quality standards
through organisational change and new production processes. Since these investments are not
observable, customers only learn about the true quality slowly, through consumer reports and the
media.2
In the model, illustrated in ¯gure 1, one long-lived ¯rm sells a product of high or low quality
to a continuum of identical short-lived consumers. Product quality is a function of the ¯rm's past
investments. The quality then determines future prices through imperfect market learning: a high
quality product generally leads to a higher consumer utility than a low quality product, but learning
is obstructed by noise. At each point in time, consumers' willingness to pay is determined by the
market belief that the quality is high, xt, which we call the reputation of the ¯rm. This reputation
changes over time as a function of (a) the equilibrium beliefs of the ¯rm's investments, and (b)
market learning about the product quality. Our model nests three types of market information
structures that have received attention in the literature on imperfect monitoring:
1. In the good news case the product usually generates constant utility. However, at random
times a high-quality product enjoys a breakthrough, revealing its high quality. Such good
news may occur in academia when a paper becomes famous, in the bio-tech industry when
a trial succeeds, and for actors when they win an Oscar.
2. In the bad news case the product usually generates constant utility. However, at random
times the low quality product su®ers a breakdown, revealing its low quality. Such bad news
may occur in the computer industry when batteries explode, for borrowers when the default
on a loan, and for doctors when they are sued for medical malpractice.
3. In the Brownian news case a high-quality product generates a higher mean utility than a
low-quality product, but customers learn slowly because of a normally distributed random
1See \Dell to Recall 4m Laptop Batteries", Financial Times, 15th August 2006.
2See \Detroit Carmakers on a Journey to Recover Reputation", Financial Times, 24th December 2008.
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Figure 1: Timeline.
error. As a result, beliefs changes continuously over time. Such continuous updating occurs as
drivers learn about the build-quality of a car, as clients learn about the skills of a consultancy,
and as callers learn about the customer service of a telephone service provider.
In a Markovian equilibrium the ¯rm's value is a function of its product quality and its repu-
tation. As illustrated in ¯gure 1, both quality and reputation move slowly and therefore can be
interpreted as assets, which the ¯rm builds up at times, and which it depletes at other times. Rep-
utation is valuable because it determines the ¯rm's revenue. Quality in turn is valuable because
a high quality product yields higher expected utility to customers, increasing the ¯rm's future
reputation. Crucially, as quality is persistent, this reputational payo® does not take the form of an
immediate one-o® reputational boost but it accrues to the ¯rm as a stream of future reputational
dividends. Theorem 1 formalizes this idea by writing the asset value of quality, i.e. the di®erence in
the value between a high quality ¯rm and a low quality ¯rm, as the net present value of its future
reputational dividends. This formula is important because it is precisely this value of quality which
determines the investment incentives of the ¯rm.
To analyse these incentives further, we have to take a stance on the market information struc-
ture and do so by focusing on the three cases above. These cases are analytically tractable and
we discuss in Section 7.1 how their insights qualitatively carry over to other market information
structures.
In the good news case (Section 4) equilibria are work-shirk: The ¯rm works if and only if its
reputation lies below a cuto® x¤. Intuitively, the reputational dividend consists of the possibility
of a product breakthrough, revealing the ¯rm's high quality and boosting its reputation to 1.
Since the bene¯t of such a reputational boost decreases in the ¯rm's reputation, so do investment
incentives. The form of the equilibrium implies that reputational dynamics converge to a cycle:
A ¯rm with low reputation works, eventually jumps to reputation 1 where it starts shirking; the
¯rm's reputation then drifts down until it hits the cuto® and starts working again.
The bad news case (Section 5) is in many ways the opposite to the good news case. Equilibria
are shirk-work: The ¯rm works if and only if its reputation lies above a cuto® x¤. Intuitively, the
3reputational dividend is insurance against a product breakdown, revealing the ¯rm's low quality
and destroying its reputation. Since the bene¯t of such insurance increases in the ¯rm's reputation,
so do investment incentives. The form of the equilibrium implies that reputational dynamics
diverge: A ¯rm with reputation below the cuto® shirks forever, causing its reputation to fall to 0;
a ¯rm with reputation above the cuto® works forever, causing its reputation to approach 1.
Our analysis of the Brownian news case (Section 6) indicates that the good news results are
more robust than those for bad news. When e®ort is su±ciently cheap, equilibrium is essentially
unique and work-shirk. In contrast, there is never a shirk-work equilibrium. This asymmetry
hinges on the reputational drift due to equilibrium beliefs. When x ¼ 0 and x ¼ 1, market
learning is slow and the reputational dividend is small. At the top, work is not sustainable: if the
¯rm is believed to working, the ¯rm's reputation stays high and the reputational dividend stays
small, undermining the incentive to invest. At the bottom, work may be sustainable: if the ¯rm
is believed to work, the ¯rm's reputation drifts up and reputational dividends increase, sustaining
the incentive to invest. Crucially, a ¯rm exerts e®ort at x ¼ 0 not because of current reputational
dividends, but because of those in the future. This argument is self-ful¯lling: the ¯rm works at
low reputations because it is believed to work. This suggests another, shirk-work-shirk, type of
equilibrium where a ¯rm with a low reputation is trapped in a shirk-hole in which market learning
is too slow to incentivise e®ort. While such an equilibrium may exist, Theorem 4 shows that it
disappears for small costs.
We can link our results to models in which quality is chosen in every period (e.g. Klein and
Le²er (1981), Mailath and Samuelson (2001)) by taking the obsolescence rate of quality ¸ to
in¯nity. With complete information, an increase in ¸ front-loads the returns to investment and
increases investment incentives. With incomplete information, there is a countervailing e®ect:
For large values of ¸, equilibrium beliefs dominate market learning in determining reputational
dynamics. In the good news and Brownian news cases, work-shirk pro¯les with positive e®ort
cannot be supported when ¸ is high since the distribution of reputations degenerates to a peak
at the work-shirk cuto® and expected reputational dividends vanish. On the other hand, for high
¸, pure shirking is an equilibrium. In the bad news case, to the contrary, investment incentives
increase in the obsolescence rate and any shirk-work pro¯le is sustainable as an equilibrium.
1.1 Theoretical Literature
Our paper forms a bridge between classical models of reputation with exogenous types, and models
of repeated games. In contrast to the repeated games literature, we suppose there is a state variable
which links the periods. In contrast to reputation models, we suppose the state variable is the
quality of the ¯rm's product rather than some exogenous ability type of the ¯rm (see ¯gure 2). As
a consequence, long-term dynamics are driven by reputational investment incentives rather than
by exogenous type changes.
4In their reputation paper, Mailath and Samuelson (2001) consider a ¯rm that sells a good
of unknown quality. There are two types of ¯rms: a competent ¯rm who can choose high or
low e®ort, and an inept ¯rm who can only choose low e®ort. The actual product quality is then
a noisy function of the ¯rm's e®ort. From the consumer's perspective, utility is determined by
the probability the ¯rm is competent (the ¯rm's reputation) multiplied by the probability that a
competent ¯rm exerts e®ort.
Mailath and Samuelson derive a striking result: there is a unique Markov perfect equilibrium
in pure strategies in which the competent ¯rm always chooses low e®ort. When the reputation is
close to 1, it is impossible to sustain high e®ort for the same reason as in our paper. E®ort then
unravels from the top: If the ¯rm is known to be shirking when its reputation passes some cuto®,
it has no incentive to exert e®ort just below this cuto® since success would mean an increase in
reputation and an immediate collapse in the price. In contrast, in our paper, product quality is
persistent. Thus, the price drifts down continuously when the ¯rm starts to shirk, and unravelling
is prevented.
HolmstrÄ om (1999) examines a signal-jamming model where an agent of unknown ability can
exert e®ort to confuse the learning of her employer. When the agent's type is constant, the
employer gradually learns the agent's ability, and e®ort declines over time. When the agent's type
exogenously changes over time, some e®ort level is sustained in the stationary equilibrium.
There is a wider literature on reputation models with moral hazard and ¯xed types, surveyed
in Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008). A number of these papers examine how a ¯rm's incentives to
exert e®ort vary over its lifecycle. First, incentives are low towards the end of the ¯rm's life (Kreps
et al. (1982), Diamond (1989)). Second, incentives are low when updating is slow (Benabou
and Laroque (1992), Mailath and Samuelson (2001)). Third, when reputation can be lost with
one piece of bad news, incentives increase in the level of reputation (Diamond (1989)). Together
these papers help explain how demand varies across ¯rms and over time (Foster, Haltiwanger, and
Syverson (2008)).3
When compared to the repeated games literature (e.g. Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin (1990)),
our model has an evolving state variable. Nevertheless, the way that incentives for e®ort are
determined by the signal structure in our paper echoes a similar theme in the repeated games
literature. Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991) and Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007a) consider a
repeated prisoners' dilemma game with imperfect public monitoring. They ¯nd that ¯rst-best is
attainable as players become patient if the public signal indicates defection (»bad news), but is
not attainable if the public signal indicates cooperation (»good news) or is generated by Brownian
motion.4
3Industry dynamics have been analysed with complete information models with exogenous ¯rm types (Jovanovic
(1982), Hopenhayn (1992)) or endogenous capital accumulation (Ericson and Pakes (1995)). The di®erence between
these two approaches is analogous to the distinction between our paper and classical reputation papers.
4Also see Faingold and Sannikov (2007) on games with long-run and short-run players, and Sannikov and Skrzy-
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Figure 2: Relation to Literature. This ¯gure shows the relationships between this paper, Mailath and
Samuelson (2001) and HolmstrÄ om (1999).
Finally, our paper is related to contract design with persistent e®ort. Fernandes and Phelan
(2000) suppose that an agent's output depends today on e®ort both today and yesterday, and
derive a recursive formulation to solve for the principal's optimal contract. Jarque (2008) shows
that the problem is much simpler when output depends on the geometric sum of past e®orts and
the cost of e®ort is linear. Unlike these papers, our consumers simply react to the ¯rm's actions,
rather than designing contingent contracts.
1.2 Empirical Literature
There are a number of empirical papers examining the importance of reputation in internet auc-
tions (eBay). Resnick, Zeckhauser, Swanson, and Lockwood (2006) ¯nd that a new seller obtains
signi¯cantly lower prices than a seller with a good feedback score. Cabral and Horta» csu (2009)
similarly ¯nd that a seller with negative feedback obtains signi¯cantly lower prices. More interest-
ing, Cabral and Horta» csu (2009) look at the seller's reactions, showing that a seller who receives
one negative feedback is more likely to obtain a second negative feedback, and is more likely to
exit. This suggests that either underlying quality is correlated over time, or a seller who receives
negative feedback exerts less e®ort, as in our bad news case.
Studies have also examined the role of reputation in other markets. In the airline industry, a
crash reduces the stock market value of the airline and manufacturer in question, reduces demand
for all aviation, but increases the value of ¯rms who compete directly with the crashed airline
(Chalk (1987), Borenstein and Zimmerman (1988), Bosch, Eckard, and Singal (1998)). In the
restaurant market, the introduction of grade cards increased investments in hygiene, and had the
biggest e®ect on non-chain restaurants (Jin and Leslie (2003, 2009)). In the vehicle emission
testing market, garages with higher pass rates can demand higher prices (Hubbard (1998, 2002)).
In all of these cases, ¯rms make investments that a®ect the quality of the product, and hence their
reputation. While these studies demonstrate the importance in maintaining a reputation, there is
pacz (2007b) on simultaneous move games with Brownian and Poisson news.
6little evidence on the e®ect of reputation on the ¯rm's investment incentives, as examined in this
paper.
2 Model
Basics: Time t 2 [0;1) is continuous and in¯nite. The common interest rate is r 2 (0;1).
Firm and Consumers: There is one ¯rm and a continuum of consumers. At any point in time
t the ¯rm's product can have high or low quality, µt 2 fL = 0;H = ¹g, where ¹ > 0. The
expected instantaneous value of the product to the consumer equals the increment of a stochastic
process dZt = dZt (µt;"t) with expected value E[dZt] = µtdt and stochastic component "t that is
independent over time. We will often focus on three functional speci¯cations:
(a) Good news: dZt = 0 almost always but a good product has a breakthrough with arrival rate
¹ generating consumer utility of dZt = 1
(b) Bad news: dZt = ¹dt almost always but a bad product has a breakdown with arrival rate ¹
generating consumer disutility of dZt = ¡1
(c) Brownian news: dZt = µtdt + dWt
Strategies: At time t the ¯rm chooses e®ort ´t 2 [0;1] at cost c´tdt. Product quality µt is
a function of past e®ort (´s)0·s·t via a Poisson process with arrival rate ¸ (independent of "t)
that models quality obsolescence. Absent a shock, quality is constant: µt+dt = µt, while at a
shock, previous quality becomes obsolescent and quality is determined by the level of investment:
Pr(µt+dt = ¹) = ´t. This implies Pr(µt = H) =
R t
0 ¸e¸(s¡t)´sds + e¡¸t Pr(µ0 = H).5
Information: Realized consumer utility dZt is public information, while actual product quality
µt is observed only by the ¯rm.6 The market belief about product quality xt = Pr(µt = ¹) at time
t is called the ¯rm's reputation.
Reputation Updating: The reputation increment dxt = xt+dt ¡ xt is governed by realized
consumer utility dZt and believed e®ort e ´t. As these are independent, dxt can be decomposed
additively:
dxt = ¸(e ´t ¡ xt)dt + xt(1 ¡ xt)
Pr(dZtjH) ¡ Pr(dZtjL)
xt Pr(dZtjH) + (1 ¡ xt)Pr(dZtjL)
: (2.1)
5This formulation provides a simple way to allow the ¯rm's type to depend on its past investments. One can view
e®ort as the choice of absorptive capacity, determining the ability of a ¯rm to recognise new external information
and apply it to commercial ends (Cohen and Levinthal (1990)). Equivalently, one could assume the ¯rm ¯rst sees
the new technology arrive and chooses whether to adopt it at cost k = rc=¸.
6The assumption that the ¯rm knows the quality of its product is irrelevant since the cost is independent of µ.
7We denote by dµxt the increments conditional on quality µ.7
Pro¯t and Consumer Surplus: The ¯rm and consumers are risk-neutral. At time t the ¯rm
sets price equal to the expected value ¹xt. While consumers get utility 0 in expectation, the ¯rm's
instantaneous pro¯t is (¹xt ¡ c´t)dt and its discounted present value is thus given by:
Vµ (x;´; e ´) := r
Z 1
t=0
e¡rtEµ0=µ;x0=x;´;e ´ [¹xt ¡ c´t]dt. (2.2)
Markov-Perfect-Equilibrium: We assume Markovian beliefs e ´ = e ´ (x) and show below that
optimal e®ort ´ = ´ (x) is independent of history and current product quality µ. A Markov-
Perfect-Equilibrium h´; e ´i consists of a Markovian e®ort function ´ : [0;1] ! [0;1] for the ¯rm
and Markovian market beliefs e ´ : [0;1] ! [0;1] such that 1) ´ 2 ´¤ (e ´) := argmax´ fVµ (x;´; e ´)g
maximizes ¯rm value Vµ (x;´; e ´), given x and e ´, and 2) market beliefs are correct: e ´ = ´. In a
Markovian equilibrium ´, we will write the ¯rm's value as a function of its quality and its reputa-
tion: Vµ(x).
2.1 Optimal Investment Choice
In principle, the ¯rm's e®ort choice ´ as well as market beliefs e ´ could depend on the entire public
history dZt = (dZs)0·s<t, as well as the private history µt = (µs)0·s<t and time t. We assume
that market beliefs e ´ are Markovian because we think of the continuum of consumers as sharing
their experience in an imperfect way, e.g. through consumer reports. For Markovian beliefs e ´, all
payo® relevant parameters at time t depend on the history only via the current product quality µt
and the ¯rm's reputation xt. Thus, the optimal e®ort choice of the ¯rm only needs to depend on
these two parameters.
The bene¯t of e®ort in [t;t + dt] is the probability of a technology shock hitting, ¸dt, times
the di®erence in value functions ¢(x) := VH (x)¡VL (x), which we call the asset value of quality.
The marginal cost of investment is rc, and thus optimal e®ort ´ (x) is given by
´ (x) =
(
1 if rc < ¸¢(x)
0 if rc > ¸¢(x)
: (2.3)
Optimal e®ort is therefore independent of the current quality of the ¯rm µt.
Lemma 1 summarizes this discussion:
7The reason for modelling time as continuous is purely pragmatic. If time were measured in discrete periods, the
updating equation (2.1) would be complicated by a dt
2 term because in every period market learning would already
take the equilibrium e®ort decision into account.
8Lemma 1 For Markovian beliefs e ´ (x) there is an optimal Markovian e®ort function ´ (x) that
depends solely on the ¯rm's reputation but not on its product quality. Additionally, ´ (x) satis¯es
equation (2.3).
Equation (2.3) makes the model more tractable and is the reason that we assume the cost of
e®ort to be independent of product quality and past e®ort. An implication of equation (2.3) is
that our results are not driven by the asymmetric information about product quality µ, but solely
by the unobserved investment ´ into future quality. We analyse asymmetric costs in Section ??.
2.2 Cuto® Equilibria and Reputational Dynamics
We call an equilibrium work-shirk, if there exists a cuto® x¤ such that a ¯rm with low reputation
x < x¤ exerts e®ort, ´(x) = 1, whereas a ¯rm with a high reputation x > x¤ does not, ´(x) = 0.
The opposite case, where low reputations shirk and high reputations work, is called a shirk-work
equilibrium.
Reputational dynamics of work-shirk equilibria are fundamentally di®erent from those of shirk-
work equilibria. Net of market learning, the dynamics dx = ¸(e ´t ¡xt)dt are convergent in a work-
shirk equilibrium, i.e. dx > 0 for x < x¤ and dx < 0 for x > x¤, but divergent in a shirk-work
equilibrium.
A set of reputations S µ [0;1] is called a shirk-hole if the ¯rm shirks ´(x) = 0 for all x 2 S and
S is closed under reputational dynamics in that Pr(xt 2 S) = 1 if x0 2 S. For future use, de¯ne
¢x¤(x) to be the asset value of quality for a ¯rm with reputation x when both actual e®ort ´ and
believed e®ort e ´ are work-shirk with cuto® x¤.
3 General Results
In this section we prepare the ground-work for the analysis of the good, bad and Brownian news
cases. In Section 3.1 we derive the welfare maximising e®ort. As noted above, the ¯rm's value
Vµ (x) is a function of it's reputation and quality. In Section 3.2 we show that an increase in
reputation increases the price today and tomorrow, and therefore increases Vµ (x). In Section 3.3
we show that a higher quality derives its value indirectly, through its e®ect on future reputation.
In particular, Theorem 1 interprets the asset value of quality as the net present value of future
reputational dividends. Finally, Section 3.4 derives some general results about the ¯rm's e®ort
choice.
3.1 Welfare
Suppose product quality is publicly observed. Then the bene¯t of exerting e®ort equals the obso-
lescence rate ¸ times the price di®erential ¹ divided by the e®ective discount rate r +¸. Thus the
9¯rst-best e®ort choice is given by:
´ =
(
1 if c < ¸
r+¸¹
0 if c > ¸
r+¸¹
: (3.1)
There is no equilibrium with positive e®ort if c > ¸
r+¸¹. In this case, welfare is negative and
the ¯rm makes negative pro¯ts as consumers receive zero utility in equilibrium. The ¯rm therefore
prefers to shirk at all levels of reputation, thereby guaranteeing itself a non-negative payo®.
We thus restrict attention in the paper to the case c < ¸
r+¸¹.
3.2 Value of Reputation
Lemma 2 shows that, when the ¯rm is choosing its e®ort optimally, the value function is increasing
in reputation.8 To prove the lemma, we need to rule out the possibility that a ¯rm with a higher
initial reputation may shirk, lose its product quality, and fall behind a ¯rm with a lower initial
reputation. We do this by observing that a ¯rm always has the option to mimic a ¯rm with a
slightly lower reputation.
Lemma 2 Given an optimal response to market beliefs ´¤(e ´), the value function of the ¯rm
Vµ(x;´¤(e ´); e ´) is strictly increasing in its reputation x and increasing in market beliefs e ´.
Proof. Fix µ, (x0; e ´0) and (x00; e ´00) ¸ (x0; e ´0), i.e. x00 ¸ x0 and e ´00 (x) ¸ e ´0 (x) for all x. Write
the best response ´¤(e ´0) to the Markovian beliefs e ´0 in a non-Markovian way as a function of the
public history ´(dZt) = ´
¡
x
¡
dZt; e ´0;x0¢¢
. For any realization of the random processes, denote by
(x00
t;µ00
t ;´00
t ;dZ00
t ) the trajectory of reputation, quality, e®ort and utility given e®ort ´(dZt), initial
reputation x00 and market beliefs e ´00, and by (x0
t;µ0
t;´0
t;dZ0
t) the corresponding trajectory given
´;x0; e ´0.
By construction, e®ort ´0
t = ´00
t , quality µ0
t = µ00
t , and utility dZ0
t = dZ00
t will coincide for all times
t. Reputation on the other hand may start at di®erent levels x00 ¸ x0 and because the updating
equation (2.1) implies that xt+dt (xt; e ´t;dZt) is increasing in xt and e ´t, we get x00
t ¸ x0
t.
Thus, by mimicking the e®ort of the ¯rm with lower initial reputation x0, the ¯rm with a
strictly higher initial reputation x00 can secure itself a strictly higher value. By Lemma 1 there
must be a Markov strategy that is at least as good as this mimicking strategy. ¤
Lemma 2 implies that across equilibria ´;´0, with ´0(x) ¸ ´(x) for all x, the ¯rm's value is
increasing in e®ort Vµ(x;´0;´0) ¸ Vµ(x;´;´).
8While it is unclear whether these monotonicity results hold for non-equilibrium h´; e ´i, Lemma 6 in Appendix
C.1 extends them to work-shirk e®ort functions where the cuto® type x
¤ is indi®erent between working and shirking.
103.3 Value of Quality
As shown in Section 2.1, investment incentives are driven by the asset value of quality ¢(x). To
analyse this value, we can decompose it into (a) the immediate bene¯t of a positive market signal,
called the reputational dividend, and (b) the continuation bene¯t of a high quality product:
¢(x) = (1 ¡ rdt)(1 ¡ ¸dt)Ex [VH(x + dHx) ¡ VL(x + dLx)] (3.2)
= (1 ¡ rdt ¡ ¸dt)Ex [(VH(x + dHx) ¡ VH(x + dLx)) + ¢(x + dLx)]:
The ¯rst line uses the principle of dynamic programming, while the second adds and subtracts
VH(x + dLx). Integrating up yields equation (3.3) in Theorem 1, which expresses the asset value
of quality as the discounted sum of future reputational dividends. Equation (3.4) follows from the
alternative decomposition of (3.2) when we add and subtract VL(x+dHx) instead of VH(x+dLx).
These expressions serve as a work-horses throughout the paper.
Theorem 1 Fix any Markovian beliefs e ´ and a Markovian best response ´¤ (e ´). Then two closed-
form expressions for the value of quality ¢(x) are given by
¢(x) =
Z 1
0
e¡(r+¸)tEx0=x;µt=L[DH(xt)]dt (3.3)
=
Z 1
0
e¡(r+¸)tEx0=x;µt=H[DL(x)]dt (3.4)
where µt = L is short for µs = L for all s 2 [0;t], and the reputational dividend Dµ (x) is de¯ned
by
Dµ(x) := E[Vµ(x + dHx) ¡ Vµ(x + dLx)]=dt.
Proof. To integrate up (3.2), ¯x x and set Ã(t) := Ex0=x;µt=L [¢(xt)]. Up to terms of order o(dt)
we have
¡d
³
Ã (t)e¡(r+¸)t
´
= ¡e¡(r+¸)t (Ã (t + dt) ¡ Ã (t) ¡ (r + ¸)dtÃ (t))
= e¡(r+¸)tEx0=x;µt=L [¡Ext [¢(xt + dLxt)] + (1 + (r + ¸)dt)¢(xt)]
= e¡(r+¸)tEx0=x;µt=L [DH(xt)]dt
and (3.3) follows. ¤
Corollary 1 Fix any Markovian beliefs e ´ and a Markovian best response ´¤ (e ´). For a given
reputation x, a high-quality ¯rm has a higher value than a low-quality ¯rm, i.e. VH (x) ¸ VL (x).
Proof. By the updating equation (2.1) we have dHx ¸ dLx, by Lemma 2 we get Dµ(x) =
Vµ(xt +dHxt)¡Vµ(xt +dLxt) ¸ 0. Finally by Theorem 1 we get ¢(x) = VH (x)¡VL (x) ¸ 0. ¤
113.4 Investment Levels
Lemma 3 (Some E®ort Somewhere) For su±ciently low costs c, pure shirking, i.e. ´(x) = 0
for all x, is not an equilibrium.
Proof. Fixing ´(x) = e ´(x) = 0, value functions and ¢ do not depend on c, and ¢(x) > 0 for
some x. Thus, as the cost of e®ort vanish c ! 0, its bene¯ts ¸¢(x) are constant and thus bounded
away from 0, contradicting the equilibrium condition. ¤
This result is in contrast to reputational models with inept ¯rms where shirking is always an
equilibrium, even if costs of working are 0. As discussed in the introduction the critical di®erence
in this model is that expected quality and price still depend on the ¯rm's reputation - and in
particular are greater than 0 - even when the ¯rm is believed to be shirking.
Lemma 4 (No E®ort at the Top) If no market signal dZt perfectly reveals low quality, i.e. if
Pr(dZtjL)
Pr(dZtjH) < 1 for all dZt, then a ¯rm with a perfect reputation x = 1 must be shirking with positive
probability: ´ (1) < 1.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that ´ (1) = 1 in equilibrium. By the assumption that
Pr(dZtjL)
Pr(dZtjH) <
1, a ¯rm with perfect reputation x = 1 can never lose its reputation, irrespectively of the consumer
utility dZt it generates. Thus dHxt = dLxt = 0 and by Theorem 1 the asset value of quality ¢(x)
equals 0. Thus, ´ (1) = 1 cannot be sustained in equilibrium. ¤
The proof actually shows a slightly stronger statement: In no equilibrium the ¯rm can be
working for all reputation levels x in an interval of arbitrary high reputations (1 ¡ ";1).
4 Good News
Assume that consumers learn about quality µt from infrequent product breakthroughs that reveal
µ = H with arrival rate ¹. Absent a breakthrough, updating evolves deterministically according
to:
dx
dt
= ¸(´(x) ¡ x) ¡ ¹x(1 ¡ x): (4.1)
We de¯ne xt as the deterministic solution of the ODE (4.1) with initial value x0.
The reputational dividend, which is the value of having a high quality in the next instant,
equals the value of increasing the reputation from x to 1 times the probability of a breakthrough:
DH(x) = VH(x + dHx) ¡ VH(x + dLx) = ¹(VH(1) ¡ VH(x))dt
12Conditioning on the ¯rm always being low quality, in order to prevent a breakthrough, the time
path of reputation is given by (4.1). Using equation (3.3), the asset value of quality is:
¢(x0) =
Z 1
0
e¡(r+¸)t¹[VH(1) ¡ VH(xt)]dt (4.2)
The reputational dividend VH(1) ¡ VH(xt) is decreasing in xt, so that ¢(x0) is decreasing in x0.
It follows that any equilibrium is work-shirk. Intuitively, when a breakthrough occurs the ¯rm's
reputation immediately jumps to 1. Since this jump is larger for a low-reputation ¯rm, incentives
to invest decrease in reputation and the equilibrium is work-shirk.
The form of the equilibrium implies that the reputational dynamics converge to a cycle. Absent
a breakthrough, the ¯rm's reputation converges to a stationary point ^ x = minf¸=¹;x¤g where the
¯rm works with positive probability. When a breakthrough occurs, the ¯rm's reputation jumps
to 1. The ¯rm is then believed to be shirking, so its reputation drifts down to ^ x, absent another
breakthrough. In the long-run, the ¯rm's reputation therefore cycles over the range [^ x;1].
Theorem 2 In the good news case
(a) Every equilibrium is work-shirk.
(b) Reputational dynamics converge to a non-trivial cycle.
(c) If ¸ ¸ ¹, the equilibrium is unique.
(d) For su±ciently high ¸, zero-e®ort is the only equilibrium.
Proof. Part (a). Reputation xt follows (4.1), so an increase in x0 raises xt at each point in
time. Lemma 2 says that VH(x) is strictly increasing in x, so equation (4.2) implies that ¢(x0) is
decreasing in x0. Part (b) follows from (a).
Part (c). We will show that ¢x¤(x¤) is decreasing in x¤. Under the assumption ¸ ¸ ¹,
the reputational dynamics xt starting at cuto® x0 = x¤ are stuck at x¤. Thus, by equation
(4.2) the value of quality is the discounted present value of an reputational boost from x¤ to 1:
¢x¤(x¤) =
¹
r+¸ (VH;x¤(1) ¡ VH;x¤(x¤)). In Appendix A.1 we show that the latter term is given by
VH;x¤(1) ¡ VH;x¤(x¤) =
Z 1
t=0
e¡rtr¹(xt ¡ x¤)
·
¸
¸ + ¹
+
¹
¸ + ¹
e¡(¹+¸)t
¸
dt; (4.3)
where x0 = 1. Note that, in this expression, the terms in the brackets capture the possibilities of
¸ and ¹ shocks while xt descends from 1 to x¤. Equation (4.3) is decreasing in the cuto®, so the
equilibrium is unique.
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Figure 3: Dynamics in Good News (left) and Bad News (right). This picture illustrates how the
reputational drift dx=dt, absent a breakthrough, changes with the reputation of the ¯rm, x. These pictures
assume ¸ = ¹ and x¤ = 1=2. The dark line shows the drift when beliefs are correct.
Part (d). Let x¤ = 0. Using part (a) and xt · e¡¸t, we get
¸¢0(0) ·
¸
r + ¸
¹
Z 1
t=0
e¡(r+¸)tr¹dt =
¸
r + ¸
r¹2
r + ¸
When ¸ is su±ciently high ¸¢0(0) < rc, and the unique equilibrium exhibits zero e®ort. ¤
Suppose that ¸ ¸ ¹, so the ¯rm's reputation drifts up whenever it is known to be working (see
¯gure 3). In this case, the dynamics are stationary at ^ x = x¤, at which point the ¯rm chooses to
work with probability ´(x¤) = x¤ ¡
1 +
¹
¸ (1 ¡ x¤)
¢
so as to keep its reputation constant.
Theorem 2(c) shows that the equilibrium is unique. To understand this result, suppose the
market believes the cuto® is ~ x, and denote the ¯rm's best response by x¤(~ x). An increase in ~ x
means the ¯rm's reputation will not drift down as far, absent a breakthrough. This change bene¯ts
low-quality ¯rms more than high-quality ¯rms, reducing ¢(x). As a result, x¤(~ x) is decreasing in
~ x and there is a unique ¯xed point where x¤(~ x) = ~ x.
Theorem 2(d) says that, as technology shocks become more frequent the incentives to exert
e®ort disappear. Intuitively, when ¸ is high, equilibrium beliefs move the reputation towards x¤
very quickly. Hence a breakthrough, which raises the reputation to 1, is quickly depreciated. This
means there is little value to being a high-quality ¯rm and little value to investing. Theorem 2(d)
implies that investment is non-monotonic in the frequency of technology shocks. When shocks
are too frequent, equilibrium beliefs drive reputation and there is no incentive to invest in actual
quality. When shocks are too infrequent, investment takes too long to pay o® and, again, there is
little incentive to invest in quality. For intermediate frequencies, however, e®ort can be supported.
145 Bad News
Assume that xt is generated by breakdowns that reveal µ = L with arrival rate ¹. Absent a
breakdown, updating evolves deterministically according to:
dx
dt
= ¸(´(x) ¡ x) + ¹x(1 ¡ x): (5.1)
We de¯ne xt as the solution of the ODE (5.1) with initial value x0.
The reputational dividend, which is the value of having a high quality in the next instant,
equals the value of not losing one's reputation times the probability of a breakdown:
DL(x) = VL(xt + dHxt) ¡ VL(xt + dLxt) = ¹(VL(xt) ¡ VL(0))dt:
Conditioning on the ¯rm always being high quality, in order to prevent a breakdown, the time
path of reputation is given by (5.1). Using equation (3.4), the asset value of quality is:
¢(x0) =
Z 1
0
e¡(r+¸)t¹[VL(xt) ¡ VL(0)]dt: (5.2)
The jump size VL(xt) ¡ VL(0) is increasing in xt, so that ¢(x) is increasing in x. It follows that
any equilibrium is shirk-work. Intuitively, when a breakdown occurs a ¯rm immediately jumps to
reputation x = 0. Since this jump is larger for a high-reputation ¯rm, incentives to invest increase
in reputation and the equilibrium is shirk-work.9
The form of the equilibrium implies that the reputational dynamics diverge. Suppose we are
in an equilibrium with x¤ 2 (0;1), so ¯rms below x¤ shirk while ¯rms above x¤ work. A ¯rm that
starts with reputation above x¤ converges to reputation x = 1, absent a breakdown. If the ¯rm
is hit by such a breakdown while its product quality is still low, it gets stuck in a shirk-hole with
reputation x = 0. A ¯rm with reputation below x¤ initially shirks and may have either rising or
falling reputation, depending on parameters. In either case, its reputation will either end up at
x = 0 or x = 1.
To allow for positive e®ort in some equilibrium we impose the following assumption:
¸
r + ¸ + ¹
¹(¹ ¡ c) > rc (PE)
Theorem 3 Assume (PE) holds. In the bad news case
9For example, when writing about the explosion of Sony's batteries in Dell's laptops the Financial Times wrote
that \The withdrawal comes at a sensitive time for [Dell], which has been ¯ghting broader perceptions of poor
customer service and slowing sales growth. [However] it could have a deeper impact on Sony, given the Japanese
company's reputation for quality in the consumer electronics industry"(15th August 2006). This illustrates the point
that the jump in reputation is larger for higher reputation ¯rms.
15(a) Every equilibrium is shirk-work.
(b) If x¤ 2 (0;1) then reputational dynamics diverge to 0 or 1.
(c) If ¸ ¸ ¹ there is a non-empty interval [a;b] such that every cuto® x¤ 2 [a;b] de¯nes an
equilibrium.
(d) If ¸ is su±ciently high, every x¤ 2 (0;1] de¯nes an equilibrium.
Proof. Part (a). Reputation xt follows (5.1), so an increase in x0 raises xt at each point in
time. Lemma 2 says that VL(x) is strictly increasing in x, so equation (5.2) implies that ¢(x0) is
increasing in x0. Part (b) follows from (a).
Part (c). If ¸ ¸ ¹, the dynamics are divergent at x¤: if x0 = xt ¡ ², then limxt = 0; if
x0 = xt + ², then limxt = 1. Thus, to de¯ne value functions and ¢ at the cuto® x¤ we need to
specify whether or not x¤ works. Denote by ¢¡
x¤(x) (resp. ¢+
x¤(x)) the value of quality at x when
x¤ is believed to be shirking (resp. working). At x¤ 2 (0;1) we have ¢¡
x¤(x¤) = limx%x¤ ¸¢x¤(x)
and ¢+
x¤(x¤) = limx&x¤ ¸¢x¤(x). Lemma 2 says that VL(xt) is strictly increasing in xt, so (5.2)
implies that
¢¡
x¤(x¤) < ¢+
x¤(x¤): (5.3)
A cuto® x¤ 2 (0;1] then de¯nes a shirk-work equilibrium i®10
¸¢¡
x¤(x¤) · rc · ¸¢+
x¤(x¤): (5.4)
Equation (5.2) implies that ¢+
x¤(x¤) and ¢¡
x¤(x¤) are increasing and continuous in x¤. For the lower
bound, observe that ¸¢¡
0 (0) = 0, because a ¯rm with no reputation that is believed to be shirking is
stuck at 0 forever. For the upper bound, ¸¢+
1 (1) = ¸
r+¸+¹¹(¹¡c) because VL;1(1) = r+¸
r+¸+¹(¹¡c),
VL;1(0) = 0; and ¸¢+
1 (1) =
¸¹
r+¸ (VL;1 (1) ¡ VL;1 (0)). Under assumption (PE) equation (5.4)
therefore de¯nes a non-empty interval of cuto®s, [a;b].
Part (d). Pick any x¤ > 0. First, suppose x0 > x¤ and observe that xt ¸ 1¡e¡¸t. In Appendix
B.1 we derive the following formula for the value of quality:
¢x¤(x) =
¹
¸ + ¹
Z 1
t=0
e¡rtr(¹xt ¡ c)(1 ¡ e¡(¸+¹)t)dt (5.5)
10The case x
¤ = 0 is more subtle because there are two qualitatively di®erent e®ort-pro¯les with cuto® x
¤ = 0.
If x
¤ = 0 is believed to be working, there is no shirk-hole, and the necessary and su±cient condition for equilibrium
is that this is in the ¯rm's best interest, i.e. rc · ¸¢
+
0 (0).
However, if x
¤ = 0 is believed to be shirking, then x
¤ = 0 is a shirk-hole and the equilibrium condition is
rc · ¸¢
¡
0 (x) for all x > 0 (and rc ¸ ¸¢
¡
0 (0) which is automatically satis¯ed because ¸¢
¡
0 (0) = 0). This condition
is weaker than (5.4) as ¢
+
0 (0) < limx!0 ¢
¡
0 (x): The existence of a shirk-hole increases the value of quality. Formally,
this is re°ected in equation (5.2) in that VL (0) = 0 if reputation 0 shirks, but VL (0) > 0 if reputation 0 works.
16Taking limits,
lim
¸!1
¸¢x¤(x) ¸ lim
¸!1
¸¹
¸ + ¹
r
Z 1
t=0
e¡rt(¹(1 ¡ e¡¸t) ¡ c)(1 ¡ e¡(¸+¹)t)dt = ¹(¹ ¡ c)
where the ¯nal equality uses the fact that the integral converges to (¹ ¡ c)=r. Assumption (PE)
implies that ¹(¹ ¡ c) > rc. Hence for su±ciently large ¸, working is optimal for all x > x¤ and
any x¤.
Next suppose x0 < x¤ and observe that xt · e¡(¸¡¹)t. In Appendix B.1, we derive the following
formula for the value of quality:
¢x¤(x) =
¹
¸ ¡ ¹
Z 1
t=0
e¡rtr¹xt(e¡¹t ¡ e¡¸t)dt (5.6)
Taking limits,
lim
¸!1
¸¢x¤(x) · lim
¸!1
¸¹
¸ ¡ ¹
Z 1
t=0
e¡rtr¹e¡(¸¡¹)t dt = 0
Hence for su±ciently large ¸, shirking is optimal for all x < x¤ and any x¤. ¤
Suppose ¸ ¸ ¹, so that whenever the ¯rm is known to be shirking its reputation drifts down
(see ¯gure 3). In this case, the region below x¤ is a shirk-hole: when a ¯rm's reputation is below
the cuto®, it is certain to see its reputation decrease because of the unfavourable equilibrium
beliefs. Such a ¯rm always shirks, eventually giving rise to a low quality product and a product
breakdown destroying whatever is left of its reputation. When a ¯rm's reputation is above the
cuto®, favourable market beliefs contribute to an increasing reputation and the ¯rm invests to
insure itself against a product breakdown. At the cuto®, the ¯rm works when it is believed to be
working and shirks whenever it is believed to be shirking.11
Theorem 3(c) shows that there is an interval of equilibrium cuto®s satisfying (5.4). The multi-
plicity is driven by a discontinuity in the value function at x¤, caused by the divergent reputational
dynamics. Intuitively, the market's beliefs become self-ful¯lling. If the market believes the ¯rm
is shirking, it's reputation falls, undermining any incentive to invest. Conversely, if the market
believes the ¯rm is working, its reputation rises, causing the ¯rm to invest in order to protect its
appreciating reputation.
When ¸ < ¹ the dynamics have additional interesting features: De¯ne b x = 1 ¡ ¸
¹ 2 (0;1) to
be the stationary point in the dynamics when the ¯rm is believed to be shirking. There are two
types of equilibria:
1. Trapped equilibria. When b x < x¤, a ¯rm with reputation x 2 (0;x¤) ¯nds its reputation
converging to b x, and remains stuck in a shirk-hole. At some point is su®ers a breakdown
11The divergent dynamics imply that there will be path dependence in reputations. This is consistent with the
existence of credit traps in ¯nancial markets, and may help explain why political scandals have such dramatic e®ects
on politicians careers (Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo (2005)).
17and remains at x = 0 thereafter. Since the dynamics are divergent at x¤ the value function
is discontinuous, and there is an interval of such equilibria.
2. Permeable equilibria. When b x > x¤, a ¯rm with reputation x 2 (0;x¤) ¯nds it's reputation
increasing. If xt passes x¤ before a breakdown hits, the ¯rm starts to work and it's reputation
may converge to one. Since the value functions are continuous at a permeable cuto® x¤, there
is at most one permeable equilibrium.
Finally, Theorem 3(d) shows that as technology shocks become more frequent, then any cuto®
can be an equilibrium. Intuitively, a ¯rm that starts below the cuto® ¯nds it's reputation falling
to zero instantly and gives up, while a ¯rm above the cuto® ¯nds it's reputation rising to one
instantly and works to stay there. While outside the model, this multiplicity creates an incentive
for ¯rms to invest in marketing in order to shape consumers expectations.
6 Brownian News
We now assume that consumers learn about quality µt gradually, through the evolution of a
Brownian motion with state-dependent drift, dZt = µtdt + dWt. Updating evolves according to
dHx = ¸(´(x) ¡ x)dt + ¹2x(1 ¡ x)2dt + ¹x(1 ¡ x)dW (6.1)
dLx = ¸(´(x) ¡ x)dt ¡ ¹2x2(1 ¡ x)dt + ¹x(1 ¡ x)dW.
To calculate the value of quality we apply It^ o's formula to get:
Ex[Vµ(x + dHx)] = Vµ(x) + ¹2x(1 ¡ x)2V 0
µ(x)dt +
(¹x(1 ¡ x))2
2
V 00
µ (x)dt
Ex[Vµ(x + dLx)] = Vµ(x) ¡ ¹2x(1 ¡ x)2V 0
µ(x)dt +
(¹x(1 ¡ x))2
2
V 00
µ (x)dt.
The reputational dividend is thus:
DH(x) = Ex[VH(x + dHx) ¡ VH(x + dLx)]=dt = ¹2x(1 ¡ x)V 0
H(x). (6.2)
DH(x) declines to zero in either tail as reputational updating becomes very slow. Using equation
(3.3), the value of quality reduces to
¢(x) =
Z 1
0
e¡(r+¸)tEx0=x;µt=L[¹2xt(1 ¡ xt)V 0
H(xt)]dt: (6.3)
Theorem 4 shows that, for small costs, there exists an equilibrium whereby the ¯rm works when
its reputation is below some cuto®, x¤. In such an equilibrium, the reputation of a ¯rm below
18the cuto® tends to rise, whereas the reputation of a ¯rm above the cuto® tends to fall, leading to
cyclical dynamics. Theorem 4 also shows that, for small costs, this equilibrium is essentially unique
in that (i) the work-shirk cuto® is unique; and (ii) the work region in the work-shirk equilibrium
is arbitrarily close to the work-region in any other equilibrium. Denote the work region in an
arbitrary equilibrium by R´ = fx : ´(x) = 1g and let R¤ be the work-region in the work-shirk
equilibrium. Let h be the Hausdor® metric.
Theorem 4 There is c¤ such that for all c 2 (0;c¤):
(a) There exists x¤ 2 (0;1) such that work-shirk with cuto® x¤ is an equilibrium.
(b) Reputational dynamics converge to a non-trivial cycle.
(c) Equilibrium is essentially unique: (i) The work-shirk cuto® x¤ is uniquely determined; and
(ii) h(R´;R¤) < ², for any equilibrium ´ and any ² > 0.
(d) For ¯xed c and high enough ¸, there is no work-shirk equilibrium, but zero-e®ort is an
equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix C. ¤
Section 6.1 discusses the existence of work-shirk equilibria. Section 6.2 considers other forms
of equilibria. Section 6.3 discusses the e®ect of a high obsolescence rate (¸ ! 1).
6.1 Work-Shirk Equilibria
When costs are low, there is a work-shirk equilibrium but no shirk-work equilibrium (Lemma 4).
This asymmetry is illustrated in the left panel of ¯gure 4. Intuitively, when the ¯rm is believed to
be working, the asset value of quality is zero at x = 1 since current dividends are zero and, as the
¯rm's reputation stays at x = 1, future dividends are zero. In contrast, the asset value of quality
is positive at x = 0 since the market's belief that the ¯rm is working causes its reputation to drift
into the interior of (0;1), enabling it to collect high dividends in the future. In other words, the
¯rm wishes to invest at x = 0 not because immediate reputational dividends, which are close to
0, but because of future dividends, when the ¯rm's reputation is sensitive to true quality.
Figure 4 is almost a proof of Theorem 4(a). Elementary calculations show that:
¢1(x)
(
> 0 for x < 1
= 0 for x = 1
and ¢0
1(1) < 0:
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Figure 4: Asset Value of Quality under Full E®ort (left) and in Work-Shirk Equilibrium (right).
This ¯gure assumes that ¹ = 1, ¸ = 1, r = 1 and c = 0:01. In the work-shirk equilibrium, the resulting
cuto® is is x¤ = 0:900.
and thus for small c there exists x¤ such that
¸¢1(x)
8
> <
> :
> rc for x < x¤ (Low reputations work)
= rc for x = x¤ (x¤ indi®erent)
< rc for x > x¤ (High reputations shirk).
(6.4)
To prove part (a) we just need to replace ¢1 on the LHS with ¢x¤. The problem with this simple
argument is that it implicitly assumes continuity of ¢0
x¤ as x¤ ! 1. However, it is straightforward
to show that limx¤!1 ¢0
x¤(1) = 0 > ¢0
1(1). As a result, it could be that ¢x¤(x) is increasing in x
for x > x¤, contradicting the last condition in (6.4).
To understand this complication, consider the marginal value of reputation V 0
µ(x) to a ¯rm
with reputation x 2 [x¤;1] where x¤ ¼ 1. A reputational increment dx is valuable to the ¯rm only
as long as xtjx0=x+dx > x¤: As soon as xtjx0=x+dx = x¤ the increment xtjx0=x+dx¡xtjx0=x vanishes
because of the di®erence of drift E[dx] to the left of x¤ and to the right of x¤. As a consequence,
V 0
µ(x) and Dµ(x) may be minimized at the cuto® x¤, and one may be concerned that ¢x¤(x) is
also minimised at x¤.
To overcome this complication and show that ¸¢x¤(x¤) > ¸¢x¤(x) for x 2 (x¤;1] we need
a better understanding of the reputational dynamics dx and the marginal values V 0
µ;x¤(x) for
x;x¤ ¼ 1. Fortunately, the dynamics of (1 ¡ x) approximate a geometric Brownian motion which
is re°ected at (1¡x¤) by the large relative di®erence in the drift terms. For the high quality ¯rm,
dH(1 ¡ x) = ¡¸(´ ¡ x)dt ¡ ¹2x(1 ¡ x)
2 dt + ¹x(1 ¡ x)dW
¼
(
¡¸(1 ¡ x)dt ¡ ¹(1 ¡ x)dW for x < x¤
¸xdt for x > x¤
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Figure 5: Shirk-Work-Shirk Equilibrium. This ¯gure illustrates the asset value of quality in a work-
shirk equilibrium, ¢x¤(x). The straight line equals rc=¸. This ¯gure assumes that ¹ = 1, ¸ = 1, r = 1 and
c = 0:06. The resulting cuto®s are x = 0:910 and x = 0:958.
and likewise for dL(1 ¡ x).
This has two implications. First, while the dividend may be minimised at x¤, the value of
quality at the cuto® ¢x¤(x¤) is largely determined by the dividends at x < x¤. Second, the
marginal value of reputation and the dividend at x > x¤ are small in relation to those at x < x¤.
This is because a reputational increment essentially disappears when xt = x¤ and this happens
much sooner for initial reputations x0 > x¤ than for x0 < x¤. Hence for x > x¤, ¢x¤(x) is an
average of low dividends while xt > x¤, and a continuation value ¢x¤(x¤) when xt hits x¤. This
average comes to less than ¢x¤(x¤), as required.
6.2 Other Equilibria
Given that reputational updating is slow at x ¼ 0 and x ¼ 1, one may expect there to exist shirk-
work-shirk equilibria, where a ¯rm works when its reputation is between two cuto®s, x 2 [x;x] and
shirks elsewhere. A ¯rm with a low reputation is thus trapped in a lower shirk-hole in which market
learning is too slow to incentivise e®ort, while a ¯rm above x experiences convergent dynamics
around x.
Simulations indicate that such equilibria may exist for certain parameter ranges (¯gure 5).
Investment incentives in this equilibrium (with c = 0:06) are much higher than in the above work-
shirk equilibrium (with c = 0:01). This is because a ¯rm at the work-shirk cuto® has more to lose
when a sequence of bad utility draws can push its reputation into a shirk-region, where it may be
stuck forever.
For low costs, Theorem 4(c) shows that shirk-work-shirk equilibria disappear because a ¯rm
at the shirk-work cuto® x strictly prefers to work. Intuitively, reputational dividends and the
value of quality are uniformly bounded below on any interval [";1 ¡ "] so, when costs are small,
21all intermediate reputations prefer to work. At the lower cuto®, x, working is then very pro¯table
since it can make the di®erence between falling into the shirk-hole and sinking to x = 0, and
climbing into the work region and rising to x = x.
While no shirk-work-shirk equilibria exist for low costs, there may be other equilibria. However,
these extra equilibria are qualitatively similar to the work-shirk equilibrium and can be charac-
terised by fx;xg with ´ (x) = 1 for x < x and ´ (x) = 0 for x > x.12 These equilibria all involve
work on [0;1¡²], so they converge to the work-shirk equilibrium in the Hausdor® metric as c ! 0.
Moreover, the work-shirk transitions act like re°ection barriers implying that x ¼ x¤, so these
extra equilibria entail as least as much work as the work-shirk equilibrium.
6.3 High Obsolescence Rate
Theorem 4(d) states that, for su±ciently high ¸, the work-shirk equilibria disappear and zero-e®ort
is an equilibrium. The intuition is the same as in the good news case: The high drift towards a work-
shirk cuto® x¤ 2 (0;1) drives the marginal value of reputation to 0, and with it the reputational
dividend and the value of quality. Zero-e®ort is an equilibrium because the drift towards 0 ensures
low values of xt, and with this a diminishing reputational dividend Dµ (x) = ¹2x(1 ¡ x)V 0
µ (x).
We conjecture that zero-e®ort is the unique equilibrium as ¸ ! 1, as suggested by our
numerical simulations. For example, with a shirk-work-shirk pro¯le, the need to incentivise e®ort
at x = x implies that the size of this region, x¡x, must become small so that having high-quality
a®ects the probability of falling into the shirk region. However, as x¡x becomes su±ciently small,
the probability of entering the shirk region grows, and V (x) and ¢(x) converge to 0.
7 Extensions
7.1 Generalized Poisson-Learning
We focused above on good, bad and Brownian news for the sake of clean analytical results. We now
discuss how the qualitative insights can shed light on market learning via more general Poisson
processes.
7.1.1 Good and Bad News
Assume that the product can enjoy both breakthroughs revealing high quality with intensity ¹H,
and breakdowns revealing low quality with intensity ¹L. In this case the reputational dividend is
12For example, given the parameters in ¯gure 4, there is another equilibrium with working on [0;0:900], shirking
on [0:900;0:944], working on [0:944;0:9605] and shirking on [0:9605;1].
22given by:
Dµ (x) = ¹H (Vµ (1) ¡ Vµ (x)) + ¹L (Vµ (x) ¡ Vµ (0))
= (¹L ¡ ¹H)Vµ (x) + ¹HVµ (1) ¡ ¹LVµ (0):
Assume further that breakdowns are more likely than breakthroughs: ¹L > ¹H. This case is
similar to the pure bad news case of section 5:13 Reputational dividend and value of quality are
increasing in reputation, and any equilibrium must be shirk-work.
However, parts (b), (c) and (d) of Theorem 3 no longer hold true: Equilibrium dynamics are
similar, but now a shirking low-reputation ¯rm with a high product quality may escape the shirk-
hole with a product breakthrough. This renders the value of quality at x = 0 strictly positive, even
under adverse market beliefs. Thus, proper shirk-work equilibria, where x = 0 shirks and x = 1
works, fail to exist for low c. While incentives can thus be too high for any proper shirk-work
equilibrium, they can at the same time be too low for a full-work equilibrium, e.g. for high values
of ¸, and equilibrium may fail to exist.14
7.1.2 Generalized Bad News
We now modify the bad news case by allowing for occasional failures of high-quality products
with intensity ¹H < ¹L, as is common in the literature, e.g. Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991).
While a product breakdown still causes a discrete hit to the ¯rm's reputation it does not destroy it
completely. Lemma 4 states that in equilibrium a ¯rm with a perfect reputation cannot believed to
be working. However, the insights of the bad news section are robust to this variation in that, for
low costs c, we can still show the existence of shirk-work-shirk, and work-shirk equilibria (rather
than work-shirk and full work equilibria in the case of pure bad news).15
The shirk-work-shirk equilibrium captures the idea that a product breakdown can put a ¯rm in
the \hot-seat" where one more breakdown would ¯nish the ¯rm o®, by pushing it into a shirk-hole.
13The alternative case, with ¹H > ¹L, is similar to the pure good news case of section 4. Finally, when quality is
discovered with equal intensity, ¹H = ¹L, incentives are °at and either full-e®ort or zero-e®ort is an equilibrium.
14This argument does not yet prove that for certain parameter ranges equuilibrium does not exist: For even if
incentives are too high for a proper shirk-work equilibrium (and too low for a full-e®ort equilibrium), they need not
be too high for a zero-e®ort equilibrium.
15To prove this we need to slightly adopt the equilibrium existence proof for Brownian learning in Appendix C:
For the work-shirk equilibrium, the only remarkable di®erence is that an extra term appears in equation (C.4) as
the discontinuous reputation dynamics may now jump over the cuto®. However, this term can be matched by an
equivalent term - for the ¯rm with initial reputation `
¤ when it su®ers a breakdown - which outweighs the ¯rst term
by Lemma 9.
The shirk-work-shirk equilibrium on the other hand is in contrast to the Brownian case, in particular to Lemma
12. The key di®erence is that value functions are now discontinuous, incentivising e®ort above the cuto® but not in
the shirk-hole just below. To construct the shirk-work-shirk equilibrium, we can ¯rst choose the lower, shirk-work
cuto® low enough so as to discourage work in the shirk-hole, and then reapply the arguments in Appendix C to
prove existence of the upper, work-shirk cuto® with the required properties.
23In such an equilibrium a ¯rm that fails once will try hard but a ¯rm that fails repeatedly gives up.
7.2 Asymmetric Costs
Throughout this paper we have assumed that ¯rms of di®erent types deliver di®erent utilities to
customers but have the same cost of investment. One can extend the model to allow for asymmetric
investment costs.
To be precise, suppose the low- and high-quality ¯rms have costs cL ¸ cH. Thus, it is easier
for a high-quality ¯rm to stay on the frontier than for a low-quality ¯rm to catch up. Reputational
updating is given by equation (2.1). In particular, when
rcL > ¸¢(x) ¸ rcH
the drift term disappears and reputation evolves according to
dxt = xt(1 ¡ xt)
Pr(dZtjH) ¡ Pr(dZtjL)
xt Pr(dZtjH) + (1 ¡ xt)Pr(dZtjL)
:
In the good news model, equilibria are still work-shirk, with a low quality ¯rm's cuto® x¤
L lying
below a high quality ¯rm's cuto®, x¤
H. Using equation (4.1) the reputation in the intermediate
range evolves according to dx=dt = ¡¹x(1 ¡ x). Assuming ¸ ¸ ¹, it follows that, as in the
symmetric case, the ¯rm's reputation ultimately cycles over [x¤
L;1].
In the bad news model, equilibria are still shirk-work, with a low quality ¯rm's cuto® x¤
L lying
above a high quality ¯rm's cuto®, x¤
H. Using equation (5.1) the reputation in the intermediate
range evolves according to dx=dt = ¹x(1¡x). It follows that, as in the symmetric case, the ¯rm's
reputation converges to 0 or 1.
Finally, in the Brownian model, a work-shirk equilibrium consists of cuto®s for the high- and
low-quality ¯rms, x¤
L < x¤
H. Using equation (6.1) the reputation in the intermediate range evolves
according to dHx = ¹2x(1 ¡ x)2dt + ¹x(1 ¡ x)dW and dLx = ¡¹2x2(1 ¡ x)dt + ¹x(1 ¡ x)dW.
We conjecture that one can then extend Theorem 4 to show that a work-shirk equilibrium exists
when cL and cH are su±ciently small. In such an equilibrium, the reputation of a high- and low-
quality ¯rm tends to converge to x¤
H and x¤
L respectively.
8 Conclusion
This paper develops a new model of reputation, where the ¯rm invests in its quality, and the
quality is imperfectly observed by the market. As customers experience the product, the ¯rm's
reputation evolves. This evolution, in turn, a®ects the incentives of the ¯rm to invest in quality.
The model forms a bridge between repeated games and classical models of reputation. In contrast
24to repeated games, di®erent ¯rms may have di®erent capabilities. In contrast to classical models
of reputation, ¯rm's capabilities are a function of past decisions and are therefore endogenous.
This model seems realistic: The current state of General Motors is a function of its past hiring
policies, investment decisions and reorganisations, all of which are endogenous.
Our results highlight the role of the market information structure in determining reputational
incentives: When the market learns through good news, there is a unique work-shirk equilibrium
and convergent dynamics. When the market learns through bad news, there is a continuum of
shirk-work equilibria and divergent dynamics. The results for Brownian news looks like those for
good news: for low costs there is a work-shirk equilibrium, but no shirk-work equilibrium.
The model can be extended in many ways. Within the current framework, one would like to
study more general Poisson processes. More generally, one could consider multiple quality levels or
allow for quality ladders. Finally, it would be interesting to analyse a model with multiple ¯rms,
or models in which ¯rms could enter and exit.
25A Good News
A.1 Derivation of Equation (4.3) in Proof of Theorem 2
For a low-quality ¯rm, the value at reputation x¤ is given by:
VL(x¤) = ¹x¤:
For a high-quality ¯rm, the value at reputation x¤ 2 [x¤;1] is given by the di®erential equation:
rVH(x) = r¹x +
d
dt
VH(x) ¡ ¸[VH(x) ¡ VL(x)] + ¹[VH(1) ¡ VH(x)]:
The ¯rm's value at the cuto® x¤ is therefore:
VH(x¤) =
Z 1
t=0
e¡(r+¸+¹)t[r¹x¤ + ¸VL(x¤) + ¹VH(1)]dt (A.1)
=
r + ¸
r + ¸ + ¹
¹x¤ +
¹
r + ¸ + ¹
VH(1);
and the value of the jump in reputation is given by:
VH(1) ¡ VH(x¤) =
r + ¸
r + ¸ + ¹
[VH(1) ¡ ¹x¤]:
We now wish to evaluate VH(1) ¡ ¹x¤. As in equation (A.1),
VH(1) ¡ ¹x¤ =
Z 1
t=0
e¡(r+¸+¹)t[r¹(xt ¡ x¤) + ¸(VL(xt) ¡ ¹x¤) + ¹(VH(1) ¡ ¹x¤)]dt (A.2)
Evaluating the second term on the right hand side,
Z 1
t=0
e¡(r+¸+¹)t¸(VL(xt) ¡ ¹x¤)dt = ¸
Z 1
t=0
e¡(r+¸+¹)t
·Z 1
s=t
e¡r(s¡t)r¹(xt ¡ x¤)dt
¸
=
¸
¹ + ¸
Z 1
s=0
e¡rsr¹(xs ¡ x¤)[1 ¡ e¡(¹+¸)s]dt
Plugging back into (A.2),
r + ¸
r + ¹ + ¸
(VH(1) ¡ ¹x¤) =
Z 1
t=0
e¡rtr¹(xt ¡ x¤)
·
¸
¸ + ¹
+
¹
¸ + ¹
e¡(¹+¸)t
¸
dt
as desired.
26B Bad News
B.1 Derivation of Equations (5.5) and (5.6) in Proof of Theorem 3
Since ¸ ¸ ¹, VL(0) = 0. Equation (5.2) implies that:
¢x¤(x) =
Z 1
t=0
e¡(r+¸)t¹VL(xt)dt: (B.1)
Suppose x > x¤. Then the value of a low-quality ¯rm is given by:
VL(x) =
Z 1
t=0
e¡(r+¸+¹)t[r(¹xt ¡ c) + ¸VH(xt) + ¹ ¢ 0]dt: (B.2)
The second term here is:
Z 1
t=0
e¡(r+¸+¹)t¸VH(xt)dt = ¸
Z 1
t=0
e¡(r+¸+¹)t
·Z 1
s=t
e¡r(s¡t)r(¹xs ¡ c)ds
¸
dt
=
¸
¹ + ¸
Z 1
s=0
e¡rsr(¹xs ¡ c)[1 ¡ e¡(¸+¹)s]ds:
Plugging back into (B.2):
VL(x) =
Z 1
t=0
e¡rtr(¹xt ¡ c)
·
¸
¸ + ¹
+
¹
¸ + ¹
e¡(¸+¹)t
¸
dt:
Using equation (B.1):
¢x¤(x) =
Z 1
t=0
e¡(r+¸)t¹
·Z 1
s=t
e¡r(s¡t)r(¹xs ¡ c)
·
¸
¸ + ¹
+
¹
¸ + ¹
e¡(¸+¹)(s¡t)
¸
ds
¸
dt
=
¹
¸ + ¹
Z 1
s=0
e¡rsr(¹xs ¡ c)(1 ¡ e¡(¸+¹)s)ds;
which gives us equation (5.5).
Next, suppose x < x¤. A low-quality ¯rm's value function is given by VL(x) =
R 1
t=0 e¡(r+¹)tr¹xt dt.
Using equation (B.1):
¢x¤(x) =
Z 1
t=0
e¡(r+¸)t¹
·Z 1
s=t
e¡(r+¹)(s¡t)r¹xs ds
¸
dt
=
¹
¸ ¡ ¹
Z 1
s=0
e¡rsr¹xs(e¡¹s ¡ e¡¸s)ds;
which gives us equation (5.6).
27C Brownian Motion: Proof of Theorem 4
We will now show that for su±ciently small c there exists a cuto® x¤ such that:
(a) Cuto® is indi®erent: ¸¢x¤(x¤) = rc,
(b) High reputations shirk: ¸¢x¤(x) < rc for x > x¤,
(c) Low reputations work: ¸¢x¤(x) > rc for x < x¤.
The proof is structured as follows. In Section C.1 we show how to write the marginal value of
reputation V 0
µ(x) as the function of the \durability" of incremental reputation. In Section C.2 we
perform a change of variables, replacing the probability of high quality x = Pr(µ = H) with the
log-likelihood ratio ` = log x
1¡x.
Lemma 7 proves part (a): For every small c there exists a cuto® x¤ close to 1 such that the
cuto® is indi®erent: ¸¢x¤(x¤) = rc. Lemmas 8 and 9 prove part (b) and (c): Suppose x¤ is high
and ¸¢x¤(x¤) = rc, as guaranteed by Lemma 7. Then ¸b ¢x¤(x) < rc for x > x¤ and ¸b ¢x¤(x) > rc
for x < x¤.
Section C.6 shows the essential uniqueness of the work-shirk equilibrium. Lemma 10 proves
uniqueness of the cuto® x¤ satisfying ¸¢x¤(x¤) = rc. Lemmas 11 and 12 show that any other
equilibria must also display ´ = 1 on [0;1 ¡ "], while Lemma 4 ensures ´ = 0 on some [0;1 ¡ "0].
Finally, Lemma 13 shows that work-shirk equilibria disappear as ¸ ! 1, while zero-e®ort
becomes an equilibrium.
C.1 Value of Quality and Reputation: Reprise
Subsection 3.3 showed that both reputation and quality have value in equilibrium. Here we derive
non-equilibrium variations of those results and provide an explicit formula for the marginal value
of reputation (equation C.1). Like in the proof of Lemma 2 we will utilize non-Markovian e®ort
functions ´
¡
dZt¢
to do so.
Lemma 5 For any e®ort and belief function h´; e ´i, and any (non-Markovian) alternative e®ort
function ´
¡
dZt¢
the ¯rm's value equals:
Vµ(x) = Ex0=x;µ0=µ;´;e ´
·Z 1
0
e¡rt ¡
r
¡
¹xt ¡ c´
¡
dZt¢¢
+
¡
´(xt) ¡ ´
¡
dZt¢¢
(¸¢(xt) ¡ rc)
¢
dt
¸
Proof. Fix µ0;x0 and e ´. Consider ¯rst a \one shot deviation" from ´, i.e. an alternative e®ort
function ´ that di®ers from ´ only for t 2 [0;dt], say ´ = 1 while ´ = 0. A ¯rm that exerts e®ort
according to ´ but whose quality µdt is governed by ´ gains ¸¢(x0)dt. Thus, the ¯rm's actual
28value is the value under the more favorable process ´, minus the fair value of the quality subsidy:
Vµ(x) = Ex0=x;µ0=µ;´;e ´
·Z 1
0
e¡rtr(¹xt ¡ c´(xt))dt
¸
¡ ¸¢(x0)dt:
For \multi-period" deviations, we accumulate a term
¡
´(xt) ¡ ´
¡
dZt¢¢
¸¢(xt)dt whenever ´(xt) 6=
´
¡
dZt¢
. Thus, in general we have
Vµ(x) = Ex0=x;µ0=µ;´;e ´
·Z 1
0
e¡rt ¡
r(¹xt ¡ c´(xt)) +
¡
´(xt) ¡ ´
¡
dZt¢¢
¸¢(xt)
¢
dt
¸
= Ex0=x;µ0=µ;´;e ´
·Z 1
0
e¡rt ¡
r
¡
¹xt ¡ c´
¡
dZt¢¢
+
¡
´(xt) ¡ ´
¡
dZt¢¢
(¸¢(xt) ¡ rc)
¢
dt
¸
as required. ¤
This lemma is of a certain intrinsic interest in formalizing one more way to tweak value functions
by trading o® changes in current payo®s ¸¢(xt) ¡ rc against the evolution of the state variables.
The real reason for deriving it, however, is to apply it to work-shirk e®ort pro¯les in situations
where ¸¢(xt) ¡ rc is either small or we know its sign.
To state and prove the next lemma, we need to write the ¯rm's reputation at time t as a function
of its initial reputation x0, realized utilities dZt and the Markovian beliefs e ´: xt = xt
¡
x0;dZt; e ´
¢
.
Lemma 6 (a) In a work-shirk pro¯le with cuto® x¤ in which x¤ weakly prefers to shirk, i.e.
¸¢x¤ (x¤) · rc, the marginal value of reputation is strictly positive:
V 0
µ (x) > 0 for all x 2 [0;1].
(b) In a work-shirk pro¯le with cuto® x¤ in which x¤ is indi®erent, i.e. ¸¢x¤ (x¤) = rc, the
marginal value is given by:
V 0
µ (x) = r¹
Z
e¡rtEµ0=µ
·
@xt
@x
(x;dZt; e ´)
¸
dt > 0 for all x 2 [0;1]. (C.1)
(c) In a work-shirk pro¯le with cuto® x¤, the value of quality at x¤ is strictly positive:
¢x¤ (x¤) > 0:
Proof. For (a) and (b) let ´
¡
dZt¢
= ´(xt(x+dx;dZt; e ´)) be the non-Markovian strategy of a ¯rm
with initial reputation x that mimicks the e®ort of a ¯rm starting with initial reputation x + dx.
We decompose the incremental value of reputation as follows:
Vµ;´ (x + dx) ¡ Vµ;´ (x) = [Vµ;´(x + dx) ¡ Vµ;´(x)] + [Vµ;´(x) ¡ Vµ;´(x)]
29The ¯rst term is the reputational advantage under mimicked e®ort. It is determined by the
partial derivative of future reputation with respect to current reputation:
Vµ;´(x + dx) ¡ Vµ;´(x) = r¹
Z
e¡rtEµ0=µ;´
£
xt(x + dx;dZt; e ´) ¡ xt
¡
x;dZt; e ´
¢¤
dt
This term is always positive. Taking the limit as dt ! 0 gives rise to equation C.1, proving (b).
The second term is the net value of shirking whenever ´
¡
dZt¢
= 0 < 1 = ´(xt). It is given by
Vµ;´(x) ¡ Vµ;´(x) = Ex0=x;µ0=µ;´;e ´
·Z 1
0
e¡rt ¡
´(xt) ¡ ´
¡
dZt¢¢
(rc ¡ ¸¢(xt))dt
¸
= Eµ0=µ;´
·Z 1
0
e¡rt ¡
´(xt(x;dZt; e ´)) ¡ ´(xt(x + dx;dZt; e ´))
¢¡
rc ¡ ¸¢(xt(x;dZt; e ´))
¢
dt
¸
= Eµ0=µ;´
"Z
xt(x;dZt;e ´)<x¤<xt(x+dx;dZt;e ´)
e¡rt ¡
rc ¡ ¸¢(xt(x;dZt; e ´))
¢
dt
#
The ¯rst line applies Lemma 5. The second line applies the de¯nition of ´
¡
dZt¢
. The third line
utilizes that xt(x;dZt; e ´) < xt(x+dx;dZt; e ´) and the e®ort functions disagree i® these trajectories
are on opposite sides of x¤.
When ¸¢x¤ (x¤) · rc, this term is positive, proving part (a): Reducing e®ort on the margin is
pro¯table if its cost exceed its bene¯ts. When ¸¢x¤ (x¤) = rc, this term is of order dx2 because
both
R
e¡rt Prµ0=µ;´
£
xt(x;dZt; e ´) < x¤ < xt(x + dx;dZt; e ´)
¤
dt and rc ¡ ¸¢(xt(x;dZt; e ´)) are of
order dx, proving part (b).
(c) If the value of quality at the cuto® was non-positive ¢x¤ (x¤) · 0, the marginal value
of reputation is positive V 0
H (x) > 0 by part (a) and so is the reputational dividend DH (x) =
¹2x(1 ¡ x)V 0
H (x) > 0. But then, also the value of quality would be positive ¢x¤ (x¤) > 0.
the premise in part (a) would be satis¯ed, yielding V 0
H (x) > 0 for all x. Thus (6.3) implies
that ¢x¤(x¤) > 0, yielding a contradiction. ¤
Part (b) has the °avor of the envelope theorem: when the ¯rm's ¯rst-order condition holds at
the cuto®, then a change in the initial reputation only a®ects its payo® through the reputational
evolution. Intuitively, a ¯rm with a lower initial reputation works more, leading to a gain of
¢(x) when a technology shock hits; however, this is exactly o®set by the extra cost born by the
¯rm. The marginal value of reputation V 0
µ (x) is thus determined solely by the \durability" of the
reputational increment @xt
@x0.
Remark: When the reputational evolution hits the cuto® at time T, xT = x¤, the di®erence in
the drift terms E[dµ (x ¡ ")]¡E[dµ (x + ")] = ¸dt diminishes any reputational increment, i.e. @xt
@x0
decreases at precisely this rate. When the cuto® x¤ is \re°ecting" because either x¤ ¼ 1 or ¸ À 0,
the reputational increment dxt approximately disappears at T and we can restrict the integral in
(C.1) to times t · T.
30C.2 Updating Log-likelihood Ratios
De¯ne `(x) = log(x=(1 ¡ x)) 2 R [ f¡1;1g. Note that x(`) = e`
1+e` and d`
dx = (1+e`)
2
e` = 1
x(1¡x).
According to Bayes rule, equilibrium beliefs e ´ a®ect ` via
d`
dt
=
d`
dx
¸(e ´ ¡ x) = ¸
¡
1 + e`¢2
e`
µ
e ´ ¡
e`
1 + e`
¶
=
(
¸
¡
1 + e¡`¢
for e ´ = 1;
¡¸
¡
1 + e`¢
for e ´ = 0:
(C.2)
Market learning dZ = µdt + dW a®ects ` via 16
dµ` =
d`
dx
dµx +
1
2
d2`
dx2V ar(dµx)dt =
(
¹2
2 + ¹dW for µ = H;
¡
¹2
2 + ¹dW for µ = L:
Thus, in a work-shirk pro¯le with cuto® `¤ À 0, high reputations `t À 0 approximately follow
a Brownian motion with drift ¸ §
¹2
2 re°ected at `¤:
dµ` ¼
( ³
¸ §
¹2
2
´
dt + ¹dW for ` < `¤;
¡1 for ` > `¤:
Finally, we can write NPVs b Vµ (`) := Vµ
³
e`
1+e`
´
, value of quality b ¢(`) := ¢
³
e`
1+e`
´
, and e®ort
b ´ (`) := ´
³
e`
1+e`
´
as functions of ` and obtain:
b ¢(`) =
Z 1
0
e¡(r+¸)tE`0=`;µt=L
h
b D(`t)
i
dt; (C.3)
where the dividend is
b D(`) = ¹2b V 0
H(`t):
C.3 Indi®erence of Cuto®
We now show that for small costs there exists a high cuto® who satis¯es the indi®erence condition.
Since b ¢ and b V depend on c, we subscript them with c where useful.
Lemma 7 For every ` 2 R there exists c > 0 such that for all c¤ < c there exists `¤ > ` such that
rc¤ = ¸b ¢`¤;c¤ (`¤).
16Remember
d`
dx =
1
x(1¡x) and
d2`
dx2 =
2x¡1
x2(1¡x)2. For µ = H we have dHx = ¹
2x(1 ¡ x)
2dt + ¹x(1 ¡ x)dW and
V ar (dHx) = ¹
2x
2(1 ¡ x)
2 so that:
dH` =
d`
dx
dHx +
1
2
d
2`
dx2V ar (dµx)dt = ¹
2(1 ¡ x)dt + ¹dW +
1
2
¹
2(2x ¡ 1) =
¹
2
2
+ ¹dW:
31Proof. Fix a cuto® ` 2 R and consider b ¢`;c(`) as a function of c 2 [0;¹¸=(r+¸)]. By Lemma 6(c)
we have b ¢`;c(`) > 0 for all c. Since b ¢`;c(`) is continuous in c, it takes on its minimum b ¢`;c0(`) > 0
at some c0.
De¯ne c by rc = ¸b ¢`;c0(`) and ¯x c¤ 2 (0;c). Using the de¯nitions of c0 and c¤,
¸b ¢`;c¤(`) ¸ ¸b ¢`;c0(`) > rc¤;
so the ¯rm prefers to work. On the other hand, at ` = 1:
rc¤ > rb ¢1;c¤(1) = 0;
so the ¯rm prefers to shirk. By continuity of b ¢`;c¤(`) as a function of ` 2 R [ f¡1;1g, there
exists `¤ 2 (`;1) with rc¤ = ¸b ¢`¤;c¤(`¤). ¤
The daunting array of quanti¯ers in the statement of this lemma guarantees that we can assume
`¤ with rc¤ = ¸b ¢`¤;c¤ (`¤) as large as necessary in the upcoming arguments.
C.4 High Reputations Shirk
Lemma 8 shows that ¯rms with high reputations shirk. In proving this result we show that the
dividend of quality b D(`) is much greater below `¤ than above `¤. Intuitively, incremental reputation
above `¤ is less \durable" because it disappears when `t hits `¤ and reputational updating d`
dt
decelerates from ¡¸
¡
1 + e`¢
¼ ¡1 to ¸
¡
1 + e¡`¢
¼ ¸.
Lemma 8 Suppose `¤ is large and ¸b ¢`¤(`¤) = rc. Then ¸b ¢`¤(`) < rc for all ` > `¤.
Proof. Fix ` > `¤. Suppose `t hits the cuto® `¤ for the ¯rst time at t = T. We can then write,
b ¢`¤(`) ¡ b ¢`¤(`¤) = E
·Z T
0
e¡(r+¸)tE`0=`;µt=L
h
¹2b V 0
H (`t)
i
dt + e¡(r+¸)T b ¢`¤ (`¤)
¸
¡ b ¢`¤(`¤)
=
Z T
0
e¡(r+¸)t
³
E`0=`;µt=L
h
¹2b V 0
H (`t)
i
¡ (r + ¸) b ¢`¤ (`¤)
´
dt (C.4)
We wish to show that (C.4) is negative, and do so using two claims.
Claim 1. Fix ® > ¯ > 0 and su±ciently high `¤. Then there exists a ° > 0 such that the
discounted probability that the future reputation `t is between `¤ ¡ ® and `¤ ¡ ¯,
(r + ¸)
Z 1
0
e¡(r+¸)t Pr
`t=`¤;µt=L
[`t 2 [`¤ ¡ ®;`¤ ¡ ¯]]dt (C.5)
is bounded below by ° independently of `¤.
32Proof. Remember that the reputational dynamics `t for high values of `¤ are approximated by
a re°ected Brownian motion with ¯nite drift:
d`L ¼
( ³
¸ ¡
¹2
2
´
dt + ¹dW for ` < `¤
¡1 for ` > `¤ (C.6)
The process `t therefore has a positive probability of lying in [`¤¡®;`¤¡¯] at any time t, so (C.5)
can be bounded below by " > 0, for all su±ciently high `¤.
Claim 2. Fix ® > ¯ > 0 and M > 0. Suppose `¤ is su±ciently high and rc = ¸b ¢`¤;c(`¤). Then
b V 0
H;`¤(`¤ ¡ °) > M b V 0
H;`¤ (`¤ + ±) for all ° 2 [¯;®] and all ± > 0:
Proof. Let ° 2 [¯;®]. When `¤ is su±ciently high, the reputational dynamics are given by (C.6).
The expected drift is bounded above, and the expected time T before the reputational dynamic
starting at `0 = `¤ ¡ ° reaches the cuto® `Tj`0=`¤¡° = `¤, is bounded below independently of `¤.
Thus, E
h
d`t
d`0 (`0)
i
for `0 2 [`¤ ¡ ®;`¤ ¡ ¯] is bounded away from 0 as `¤ ! 1.
Next, consider `¤ + ±. The expected time T before `Tj`0=`¤+± = `¤ uniformly converges to 0.
This is easier to see for the posterior xt than for the log-likelihood-ratio `, as E
h
dHx
dt
i
= ¡¸x is
bounded away from 0 while 1 ¡ x¤ converges to 0. Thus, E
h
d`t
d`0 (`¤ + ±)
i
for ± > 0 converges to 0
as `¤ ! 1.
For large values of `¤ we can ignore in b V 0
H;`¤(`) ¸ r¹
R
e¡rtE
h
e`t
(1+e`t)2
d`t
d`0(`)
i
dt all terms where
`t and ` are on di®erent sides of `¤. Since e`=(1 + e`)2 is decreasing in ` > 0 we get bounds
e`t(`¤¡°)=(1 + e`t(`¤¡°))2 ¸ e`¤
=(1 + e`¤
)2 ¸ e`t(`¤+±)=
¡
1 + e`t(`¤+±)¢2
and equation (C.1) implies
b V 0
H;`¤(`¤ ¡ °)
b V 0
H;`¤(`¤ + ±)
¸
r¹
h
e`¤
(1+e`¤)2
iR
e¡rtE
h
d`t
d`0(`¤ ¡ °)
i
dt
r¹
h
e`¤
(1+e`¤)2
iR
e¡rtE
h
d`t
d`0(`¤ + ±)
i
dt
¸
R
e¡rtE
h
d`t
d`0(`¤ ¡ °)
i
dt
R
e¡rtE
h
d`t
d`0(`¤ + ±)
i
dt
Therefore, b V 0
H;`¤(`¤ ¡ °)=b V 0
H;`¤(`¤ + ±) diverges to 1 as `¤ ! 1, uniformly over all ° 2 [¯;®] and
± > 0.
33Proof of Lemma. We now show that the right hand side of equation (C.4) is negative. Let
` > `¤ À 0. Fix ® > ¯ > 0 and " > 0, and choose M = 1
". Equation (6.3) implies that
(r + ¸) b ¢`¤ (`¤) = (r + ¸)
Z 1
0
e¡(r+¸)tE`0=`¤;µt=L
h
¹2b V 0
H (`t)
i
dt
¸ (r + ¸)
Z 1
0
e¡(r+¸)t
Ã
Pr`0=`¤;µt=L (`t 2 [`¤ ¡ ¯;`¤ ¡ ®])
¤min`02[`¤¡¯;`¤¡®]
n
¹2b V 0
H (`0)
o
!
dt
¸ "M max
`2[`¤;1)
n
¹2b V 0
H (`)
o
= max
`2[`¤;1)
n
¹2b V 0
H (`)
o
where the second inequality uses Claims 1 and 2. Hence (C.4) is negative, as required. ¤
C.5 Low Reputations Work
Lemma 9 shows that ¯rms with low reputations work. For reputations ` 2
£
`;`¤¤
for some ` de¯ned
below, the optimality of working follows directly by showing that b V 0
µ(`) and b ¢0(`) are decreasing
on
£
`;`¤¤
. For reputations ` < ` the result follows from the closeness of b ¢`¤(¢) and b ¢1(¢).
Lemma 9 Assume `¤ is large, costs c are small and ¸b ¢`¤(`¤) = rc. Then ¸b ¢`¤(`) > rc for all
` < `¤.
Proof. Claim 1. There exists ` su±ciently large such that b V 0
H;`¤(¢) is strictly decreasing on [`;`¤]
for any `¤ > `.
Proof. For 0 ¿ `t < `¤, the reputational dynamics `t are approximately a Brownian motion
(C.6). Let ` be su±ciently high and consider `0 2 [`;`¤]. As long as `t < `¤ we have @`t
@`0 ¼ 1.
When the trajectory hits `¤ then @`t
@`0 ¼ 0 since `¤ is re°ecting. Using equation (C.1)
b V 0
H(`) = r¹
Z 1
0
e¡rtE`0
·
e`t
(1 + e`t)2
@`t
@`0
¸
dt ¼ r¹
Z 1
0
e¡rtE`0
·
e`t
(1 + e`t)21t<T(`0)
¸
dt (C.7)
where T(`0) is the time `t ¯rst hits `¤. Since e`t=(1 + e`t)2 is strictly decreasing for `t > 0, and
T(`0) is decreasing in `0, equation (C.7) is strictly decreasing in ` on [`;`¤].
Claim 2. There exists ` su±ciently large such that b ¢`¤(¢) is strictly decreasing on
£
`;`¤¤
for
any `¤ > `.
Proof. Pick ` as in Claim 1. Since the reputational dynamics are determined by re°ected
Brownian motion with ¯nite drift (C.6), we can pick ` À ` such that for any `¤ > `, Pr`02[`;`¤](`t 2
[`;`¤]) ¼ 1. Claim 1 says that b V 0
H;`¤(¢) is strictly decreasing on [`;`¤]. Equation (C.3) says that
34b ¢`¤(`) is the integral over b V 0
H;`¤(`t), yielding the result.
Claim 3. Assume that ¸b ¢`¤(`¤) = rc and ¯x any `. Then b ¢`¤(¢) converges to b ¢1 (¢) uniformly
on [¡1;`] as `¤ ! 1.
Proof. As `¤ ! 1, b ¢`¤(`) converges pointwise to b ¢1(`) for all `. Let `¤ À `. For any ` < `,
equations (C.1) and (C.3) imply that, b V 0
µ;`¤(`), and thus b ¢`¤(`), depend on `¤ only on trajectories
`t that reach `¤. The future discounted probability of these trajectories converges to 0 as `¤ ! 1,
so the convergence is uniform for ` < `.
Proof of Lemma. Choose 0 ¿ ` ¿ `¤. Claim 2 implies that b ¢`¤(`) is strictly decreasing in `
for ` 2 [`;`¤). Since ¸b ¢`¤(`¤) = rc, we have
¸b ¢`¤(`¤) > rc for ` 2 [`;`¤):
The function b ¢1 (¢) is bounded away from 0 on [¡1;`].17 Hence Claim 3 implies that b ¢`¤(`) is
bounded away from zero. For small costs c, we get
¸b ¢`¤(`¤) > rc for ` 2 [¡1;`];
as required. ¤
C.6 Essential Uniqueness
Lemma 10 shows that, when costs are low, there is at most one work-shirk equilibrium. Intuitively,
the cuto® `¤ must be close to 1 because ¯rms with intermediate reputations will prefer to work.
The proof then invokes a property of the Brownian reputation dynamics to conclude that the value
of quality b ¢`¤(`¤) is decreasing for high `¤, and that equilibrium is unique.
Lemma 10 For su±ciently small c, there is at most one equilibrium cuto® `¤.
Proof. Claim 1. For every ` < 1 and su±ciently low c = c
¡
`
¢
, there is no work-shirk equilibrium
with `¤ < `.
Proof. The value of quality of a ¯rm with a perfect reputation b ¢`¤(1) is bounded below
uniformly in cost of e®ort c and \not-too-high" cuto®s `¤ < `. Thus, for small c the ¯rm would
prefer to work: rc < ¸b ¢`¤(1).
Claim 2. There exists ` < 1, such that b ¢`¤(`¤) is strictly decreasing in `¤ for `¤ 2 [`;1].
17This also follows from Lemma 12.
35Proof. For 0 ¿ `t < `¤, the reputational dynamics `t are approximately a Brownian motion,
re°ected at `¤. Moreover, the dynamics d` are approximately identical for a ¯rm with reputation
`t + ² and cuto® `¤ + ². Therefore when ` is su±ciently high and `¤ > `
b V 0
H;`¤ (`0) = r¹
Z
e¡rtE`0
·
e`t
(1 + e`t)2
@`t
@`0
(`0;`¤)
¸
dt
> r¹
Z
e¡rtE`0+²
·
e`t
(1 + e`t)2
@`t
@`0
(`0 + ²;`¤ + ²)
¸
dt
= b V 0
H;`¤+²(`0 + ²)
where the inequality follows from the fact that e`t=(1+e`t)2 is decreasing in `t > 0. Using equation
(C.3), we conclude that
b ¢`¤(`¤) > b ¢`¤+²(`¤ + ²);
as required.
Proof of Lemma. When costs are small there is no equilibrium with ` < `. Suppose there are
two equilibria with cuto®s `¤
1;`¤
2 ¸ `. Then ¸b ¢`¤
1(`¤
1) = ¸b ¢`¤
1(`¤
2), which contradicts Claim 1. ¤
The following two Lemmas show that low reputations work, while Lemma 4 ensures that high
reputations shirk.
Lemma 11 Fix " > 0. The there exists c0 such that for all c < c0 and x 2 [";1 ¡ "],
¸¢´;c (x) > rc0: (C.8)
Proof. We bound the left hand side of (C.8) below, uniformly across c;´;x. To do this de¯ne the
discounted occupancy time by
©t(xjx0) =
Z
e¡(r+¸)tEx0=x;µt=L[1xt·x]dt
and let Át(xjx0) = ©0
t(xjx0) be the discounted density of xt. On [";1 ¡ "] the density Át(xjx0) is
bounded below by Á
t uniformly across (x0;´) because the drift of the Brownian motion is bounded
36above. We then have,
¸¢´;c (x) = ¸¹2
Z 1
0
e¡(r+¸)tEx0=x;µt=L
£
xt (1 ¡ xt)V 0
H (xt)
¤
dt
¸ ¸¹2"(1 ¡ ")
Z 1
0
e¡(r+¸)tEx0=x;µt=L
£
V 0
H (xt)1xt2[";1¡"]
¤
dt
= ¸¹2"(1 ¡ ")
Z 1
0
·Z 1¡²
²
V 0
H(x)Át(xjx0)dx
¸
dt
¸ ¸¹2"(1 ¡ ")
Z 1
0
Á
t[VH(1 ¡ ²) ¡ VH(²)]dt
¸ const.
for some positive constant, as required. ¤
Lemma 12 Fix " > 0. For su±ciently low costs, a ¯rm with reputation below 1 ¡ " works, i.e.
¸¢´;c(x) > rc.
Proof. Fix " > 0. From Lemma 11 we know that (C.8) holds on [";1 ¡ "]. By contradiction,
assume that there is a shirk-region in [0;"] and let the highest shirk-work cuto® be x¤ < ". Since
dividends are positive, Theorem 1 implies that
¢´;c(x¤) ¸ E[e(r+¸)T]¢´;c(")
where T is the time that a process starting at x¤ hits ². Since the ¯rm is working for x 2 [x¤;"],
E[e(r+¸)T] and therefore ¢´;c (x¤)=¢´;c (") are bounded away from 0, independently of ".
Let the cost be su±ciently low so that c < c0¢´;c (x¤)=¢´;c ("). Then we have
rc < rc0¢´;c (x¤)
¢´;c (")
< ¸¢´;c (x¤);
where the second inequality uses (C.8) at x = ". This contradicts the assumption that x¤ is
indi®erent between working and shirking, as required. ¤
C.7 Zero-e®ort as ¸ ! 1
Lemma 13 For su±ciently high ¸:
(a) Pure shirking is an equilibrium.
(b) There is no work-shirk equilibrium with x¤ 2 (0;1].
Proof. We will show that the dividend b V 0
µ (`) approaches 0 uniformly over all reputations and all
work-shirk e®ort pro¯les. That is, lim¸!1 sup`¤2[¡1;1];`2R b V 0
µ;`¤ (`) = 0, where `¤ = §1 captures
37the pure shirk (resp. work) pro¯le. Equation (C.3) then implies that lim¸!1 sup`¤2[¡1;1];`2R ¸b ¢`¤ (`) =
0.
To do so, ¯x ² and let `¤¤ > 0 solve e`¤¤
=
¡
1 + e`¤¤¢2 = ². First, consider a cuto® `¤ in the
tail, i.e. j`¤j > `¤¤. For any two processes `t and `0
t, equation (C.2) implies that in a work-shirk
equilibrium, j`0
t ¡ `tj decreases over time for any realisation of Wt. Hence @`t=@`0 · 1. Using
equation (C.1) we get:
lim
¸!1
sup
j`¤j>`¤¤;`02R
b V 0
µ;`¤ (`0) = lim
¸!1
sup
j`¤j>`¤¤;`0
E
"
r
Z
e¡rt e`t
(1 + e`t)
2
@`t
@`0
dt
#
· lim
¸!1
sup
j`¤j>`¤¤;`0
E
"
r
Z
e¡rt
Ã
Pr(j`tj < `¤¤)
4
+
Pr(j`tj ¸ `¤¤)e`¤¤
(1 + e`¤¤)
2
!
dt
#
· ".
The second line uses e`=(1+e`)2 · 1=4 and @`t=@`0 · 1. The ¯rst term under the integral vanishes
because lim¸!1 sup`0 Pr(j`tj < `¤¤) = 0 for all t. The second term is bounded by ".
Next, suppose that j`¤j · `¤¤. Suppose the process `t hits `¤ at time T. Using equation (C.1)
we get:
lim
¸!1
sup
j`¤j<`¤¤;`02R
b V 0
µ (`0) = lim
¸!1
sup
j`¤j<`¤¤;`0
E
"
r
Z
e¡rt e`t
(1 + e`t)
2
@`t
@`0
dt
#
· lim
¸!1
sup
j`¤j<`¤¤;`0
E
·
r
4
Z T
t=0
e¡rtdt +
r
4
Z 1
t=T
e¡rt @`t
@`0
dt
¸
= 0.
The second line again uses e`=(1+e`)2 · 1=4 and @`t=@`0 · 1. The ¯rst integral vanishes because
sup`0;j`¤j<`¤¤ E[T] ! 0 as ¸ ! 1. The second integral vanishes because reputational increments
disappear at an absorbing boundary, i.e. E[@`t=@`0(`¤)jt ¸ T] ! 0 as ¸ ! 1. ¤
38References
Abreu, D., P. Milgrom, and D. Pearce (1991): \Information and Timing in Repeated Part-
nerships Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships," Econometrica, 59(6), 1713{1733.
Bar-Isaac, H., and S. Tadelis (2008): \Seller Reputation," Foundations and Trends in Mi-
croeconomics, 4(4), 273{351.
Benabou, R., and G. Laroque (1992): \Using Priviledged Information to Manipulate Markets:
Insiders, Gurus and Credibility," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(3), 921{958.
Borenstein, S., and M. B. Zimmerman (1988): \Market Incentives for Safe Commercial Airline
Operation," American Economic Review, 75(5), 913{935.
Bosch, J.-C., E. W. Eckard, and V. Singal (1998): \The Competitive Impact of Air Crashes:
Stock Market Evidence The Competitive Impact of Air Crashes: Stock Market Evidence,"
Journal of Law and Economics, 41(2), 503{519.
Cabral, L., and A. Hortac »su (2009): \The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evi-
dence from eBay," forthcoming.
Chalk, A. J. (1987): \Market Forces and Commercial Aircraft Safety Market Forces and Com-
mercial Aircraft Safety," 36(1), 61{81.
Cohen, W. M., and D. A. Levinthal (1990): \Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on
Learning and Innovation," Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1), 128{152.
Diamond, D. W. (1989): \Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 97(4), 828{862.
Diermeier, D., M. Keane, and A. Merlo (2005): \A Political Economy Model of Congres-
sional Careers," American Economic Review, 95(1), 347{373.
Ericson, R., and A. Pakes (1995): \Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for
Empirical Work," Review of Economic Studies, 62(1), 53{82.
Faingold, E., and Y. Sannikov (2007): \Reputation E®ects and Degenerate Equilibria in
Continuous-Time Games," Working paper, Yale University.
Fernandes, A., and C. Phelan (2000): \A Recursive Formulation for Repeated Agency with
History Dependence," Journal of Economic Theory, 91(2), 223{247.
Foster, L., J. Haltiwanger, and C. Syverson (2008): \Reallocation, Firm Turnover and
E±ciency: Selection on Productiviy or Pro¯tability?," American Economic Review, 98(1), 394{
425.
39Fudenberg, D., D. Kreps, and E. Maskin (1990): \Repeated Games with Long-Run and
Short-Run Players," Review of Economic Studies, 57(4), 555{573.
HolmstrÄ om, B. (1999): \Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of
Economic Studies, 66(1), 169{182.
Hopenhayn, H. A. (1992): \Entry, Exit, and ¯rm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium," Econo-
metrica, 60(5), 1127{1150.
Hubbard, T. N. (1998): \An Empirical Examination of Moral Hazard in the Vehicle Inspection
Market," RAND Journal of Economics, 29(2), 406{426.
(2002): \How Do Consumers Motivate Experts? Reputational Incentives in an Auto
Repair Market," Journal of Law and Economics, 45(2), 437{468.
Jarque, A. (2008): \Repeated Moral Hazard with E®ort Persistence," Working paper, Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond.
Jin, G. Z., and P. Leslie (2003): \The E®ect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence
from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(2), 409{451.
(2009): \Reputational Incentives for Restaurant Hygiene," AEJ: Microeconomics, 1(1),
237{67.
Jovanovic, B. (1982): \Selection and the Evolution of Industry," Econometrica, 50(3), 649{670.
Klein, B., and K. B. Leffler (1981): \The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual
Performance," Journal of Political Economy, 89(4), 615{641.
Kreps, D., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson (1982): \Rational Cooperation in the
Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2), 245{252.
Mailath, G., and L. Samuelson (2001): \Who Wants a Good Reputation," Review of Economic
Studies, 68(2), 415{441.
Resnick, P., R. Zeckhauser, J. Swanson, and K. Lockwood (2006): \The value of reputa-
tion on eBay: A controlled experiment," Experimental Economics, 9(2), 79{101.
Sannikov, Y., and A. Skrzypacz (2007a): \Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Moni-
toring with Flexible Production," American Economic Review, 97(5), 1794{1823.
(2007b): \The Role of Information in Games with Frequent Actions," Working paper,
Princeton University.
40